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IT WILL  BE A LONG  TIME before  we can say with any confidence  whether 
the introduction of direct controls on wages and prices has been followed 
by a significant slowdown in their rise. Some good months and some bad 
months have occurred under the controls, just as good months and bad 
months occurred prior to their institution. I expect some slowdown in the 
inflation, but that will not settle the question, for the cause may be the con- 
trols or simply the delayed effect of the considerable slack in the economy. 
This will be a subject of debate in the coming years, just as there was a 
long  debate over whether the investment tax  credit actually stimulated 
investment. 
No matter how this academic debate comes out, some form of direct con- 
trols is likely to be with us for some time. The establishment of direct con- 
trols was widely welcomed and the program is still generally popular de- 
spite its uncertain achievements to date. The controls are not likely to be 
abandoned soon unless they run afoul of some important pressure group, 
and that has not happened so far, despite some grumbling among union 
leaders and consumers. 
Aside from public acceptance, another reason why controls probably will 
not disappear  soon is that inflationary  pressures  are hardly likely to become 
less intense as the economy moves closer to capacity operation. If controls 
are in order when the unemployment rate is 6 percent, they will be no less 
needed when unemployment drops to a sustainable level. The controls of 
World War II or the Korean War had a natural termination date, but the 
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present  program  does not. Unless  the growth  rate  of real output  increases 
markedly  from  recent  figures,  the rapid  growth  of the money  supply  com- 
bined  with  the  usual  lags  virtually  guarantees  the  preservation  of inflationary 
pressures  at least well into 1973. In recent decades,  the growth rate of 
nominal  gross  national  product  has generally  exceeded  that of the money 
stock by about 3 percentage  points.  The recent  year-to-year  expansion  of 
the money  stock  could  therefore  sustain  a growth  of money  GNP at about 
10  percent  per  year-far more  than  the expected  growth  of real  GNP. The  3 
percentage  point  difference  may  conceivably  be attributable  to interest  rate 
effects  as some have  argued,  but since  there  is little indication  of a drastic 
turnaround  in interest  rates  we cannot  put much  hope in that factor. 
If my prognosis  is correct,  what will controls actually  achieve?  The 
modest  reduction  in the rate of inflation  officially  set as a goal, even if at- 
tained,  does not provide  much  justification  for this drastic  departure  from 
our generally  successful  economic  traditions.  It may be that in the future 
the Pay Board  and Price  Commission  will serve  increasingly  as watchdogs 
over  big business  and labor.  The three-tier  classification  of firms  points  in 
this direction,  as does the recent  exemption  of most small  enterprises.  The 
Pay Board  already  spends  much  of its time on collective  bargaining  wage 
settlements. 
A strong  case can indeed  be made for better  supervision  of the labor 
unions. In the last few years, the United States has moved toward the 
situation  already  prevailing  in the United Kingdom,  where  unions have 
been able  to obtain  wage  increases  regardless  not only of productivity  but 
also of the state of the labor  market.  Since  our laws have  been  inadequate 
to deal with this problem,  the power of the unions  may have to be con- 
strained  in other  ways.  Neither  the Pay Board  nor  the Construction  Indus- 
try Stabilization  Committee  has so far  demonstrated  much  effectiveness  in 
curbing  wage  increases,  but they  may  yet learn  to do so. Perhaps  the intro- 
duction  of an official  link between  unemployment  and wages-an institu- 
tionalized  Phillips  curve-would lead  to better  results.  But  systematic  regu- 
lation of collective  bargaining  may continue  to be necessary  as long as 
labor  laws are not reformed. 
There  is ample  precedent  for fearing  that regulatory  boards  can easily 
come  under  the control  of the sector  they  are  supposed  to regulate.  The de- 
parture  of most of the labor  members  from  the Pay Board  does not neces- 
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Board  would  be responsive  to the unions  even  without  their  overt  participa- 
tion. If the Pay Board continues  to favor organized  over nonorganized 
labor, union membership  will become more attractive  and unions more 
powerful.  Such  regulation  is therefore  not likely  to improve  the workings  of 
the labor  market. 
For somewhat  different  reasons,  much  the same  holds  for  the Price  Com- 
mission.  If it concentrates  on big business,  there  is little danger  that large 
firms  will gain  undue  influence  over  it, partly  because  large  firms  are  more 
numerous  than unions and their interests  are more diverse.  On the con- 
trary,  the danger  is that the Price  Commission  will hold down the profit 
margins  of the more efficient  large  firms  to such an extent  that marginal 
firms,  who are  frequently  small,  will be squeezed.  Even  if these  small  firms 
can avoid bankruptcy,  they will then have difficulty  in attracting  capital. 
The more  the controls  emphasize  profits,  the greater  this danger  will be. 
Many  economists  believe  that price  controls  should  be confined  to large 
firms,  and recent  political  trends  also favor  this development.  There  may 
well  be a more  immediate  favorable  effect  on prices  if firms  with  large  prof- 
its are forced  to roll back their  prices.  But that will put pressure  on the 
prices  of their  less profitable  competitors,  forcing  down their  profits,  and 
perhaps  putting  them  out of business.  Therefore,  in both the labor  market 
and  the  product  market,  this  kind  of price-wage  control  is likely  to promote 
increased  concentration. 
The  present  policy,  if pursued,  may  well  bring  about  what  John  Kenneth 
Galbraith  has called "The New Industrial  State." I disagree  with Gal- 
braith's  view that this term  is already  a good description  of our economy. 
But government  wage-price  controls  may lead to it, and reduce  the effec- 
tiveness  of the natural  safeguards  of a free  market. 
There  are two main alternatives  to the current  program.  One is a pro- 
competitive  strategy.  Most economists  favor  such  a strategy,  but it is very 
hard  to achieve  because  our political  system  puts a heavy  weight on the 
preservation  of special  privileges  at the expense  of overall  economic  per- 
formance. 
The other  alternative  is to let inflation  continue.  Slowing  down  inflation 
has  to hurt  somebody,  whether  it be small  firms  or firms  that,  by one means 
or another,  have  succeeded  in carving  out a protected  position.  Neither  the 
control strategy  nor the pro-competitive  strategy  is painless.  If our po- 
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live with inflation.  The many calculations  that have been made indicate 
that  inflation  does  not seriously  hurt  any  major  group.  Our  economy  is well 
adjusted  to it. In fact  the Brazilian  experience  suggests  that economies  can 
adjust  to much  higher  inflation  rates  than  we have  experienced.  Maybe  the 
anti-inflationary  efforts  are all misplaced,  and we should  emphasize  peace, 
which  means  leaving  people  alone. I personally  favor  the pro-competitive 
strategy,  but I am not optimistic  that  it will ever  be seriously  implemented. 